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This thesis is formed of three chapters. The first chapter examines the effect on social
mobility and economic growth following the introduction of reprogenetic technology
such that parents can choose to invest in the talent or ability of their unborn children.
I find that if the economy is initially in a steady state such that social mobility is low,
the introduction of such technology can increase social mobility and economic growth.
If the economy is initially in a steady state such that social mobility is high, then the
introduction of such technology will not increase (and may decrease) social mobility
and will not affect economic growth.
The second chapter is a review of the literature on how immigration affects wages
focusing on studies of the US and UK labour markets.
The third chapter analyses how the skill premium depends on the relative supply of
high and low skilled workers in the economy, and the size of the economy. Using a
two-sector model where one sector is more skill-intensive than the other, and returns
to scale are larger in the skill-intensive sector, I find that the skill premium depends
positively on the size of the economy. I consider the effect of an exogenous increase in
the number of skilled workers (perhaps due to immigration) on the skill premium and
find that under certain conditions the skill premium may increase. I then analyse the
effect on the skill premium and the relative price of the skill intensive good in the short
and long run and compare the models predictions to the data.
The Economics of Reprogenetics:





This paper examines the effect on economic growth and social mobility following
the introduction of reprogenetic technology such that parents can invest in the
intelligence of their unborn child. If the economy is in a steady state such that
social mobility is low, the introduction of such technology may increase social
mobility and economic growth.
1 Introduction
The term “Reprogenetic” was coined by Lee M Silver, a Princeton University molecular
biology professor, in his 1997 book Remaking Eden. The term refers to the creation and
manipulation of embryos for reproductive purposes. There has been much debate in the
popular press recently about the ethics of “designer babies” as genetic enhancement
technology improves. In 2009, The Fertility Institutes, based in LA, began offering
parents the chance to choose their child’s eye and hair colour, but the program was
shut down the same year after public outcry.
A powerful genome editing technology known as Crispr, which allows manipulation
of DNA in cell nuclei, was developed in 2012 and shown to be effective in human cells
in 2013. Last year it was used to alter the genes for fur colour in mice.1 Unsurprisingly,
use of this technology has proved contoversial. On one hand, it raises the possibility of
eradicating some genetic diseases. On the other hand, concerns about the safety and
ethics of Crispr technology have led to a group of scientists publishing in Nature calling





versal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights describes reproductive
cloning of human beings as “contrary to human dignity”.3
Despite apparent widespread distaste for use of gene altering techniques on human
embryos, Crispr developer Jennifer Doudna expects that over time people will become
more comfortable with the use of such technology.4 She cites IVF as an example of a
technology that has become increasingly accepted by society following initial reserva-
tions. Within a decade or two it may be possible to screen embryos for genes related to
particular abilities or intelligence, or even to use gene therapy to add genes for a high
IQ.
My research aims to investigate the rationality of fears that a two tiered society of
genetically engineered “haves” and “have nots” could emerge if access to such technol-
ogy is unequal. I am not attempting to address directly the ethical concerns surrounding
this issue. Instead I will focus on what effect the existence of such a technology, which
in effect can to some degree be seen as enabling parents to invest in their child’s genetic
component of IQ or ability, has on overall economic growth as well as on social mobility.
Disregarding ethical and other social concerns and possible feedback effects from
these on economic growth, it is difficult to see how the ability to screen embryos and
add genes to increase IQ could not have a positive effect on productivity and hence
growth. While I show this to certainly be the case in the model considered here, the
analysis of the effects on social mobility is much more complicated and depends on
several parameters and initial conditions.
The model is based on Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2000). In this paper an individ-
ual’s success as an entrepreneur depends on his innate ability and on his background. If
his parents are entrepreneurs he inherits an advantage unrelated to ability: easier access
to capital, better education, a network of contacts, and specific knowledge about his
parents’ industry. When the rate of growth of technology is high, the world is changing
rapidly and the return to ability is higher. The value of knowledge inherited from one’s
parents is lower because the technology has changed more. Social mobility is defined
within this paper as the degree to which ability, rather than parental background or
upbringing, determines an individual’s social position and economic success.
I am adding parental investment, or more specifically parental investment into the
genetic component of ability, to the framework of Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2000).
The question is then who will actually find it optimal to invest and how these investment
decisions affect results on economic growth and social mobility.
The relationship between social mobility and economic growth has been studied




extensively by both sociologists and economists. The consensus is that high levels of
social mobility foster economic growth through more efficient allocation of resources. A
key assumption in this paper is that an increase in the growth rate reduces the relative
return to family background and increases the return to innate ability. This assumption
is also key to models of Galor and Tsiddon (1997) and Galor and Moav (2000), the
later find empirical support for this assumption. Galor and Tsiddon (1997) find that
major technological inventions increase inequality and mobility and lead to a higher
proportion of high ability individuals in technologically advanced sectors, stimulating
further technological progress. Further empirical support for this assumption comes
from Eriksson and Goldthorpe (1992) who construct an index of intergenerational social
mobilty for nine major economies. They divide these into two groups; high and low
mobility, and find that the average growth rate between 1870 and 1979 is significantly
higher in the high mobility group.
2 The Model
Individuals are of type {j,k} where j represents social background and k represents
ability. Individuals can be children of workers (j=w) or children of entrepreneurs (j=e).
Ability can be high (k=h) or low (k=l). Children are born with high ability with
probability q. Individuals are economically active for one period. Their children are
economically active in the following period. For simplicity, reproduction is asexual and
each adult has one child.
Individuals care about their immediate offspring’s income and hence an individual’s
utility is a function of their own income and their child’s income in the next period, i.e.
u = Io + δIc, (1)
where Io is their own income. Ic is their child’s income. δ is a parameter which captures
both the discount rate and the value a parent places on their child’s income relative to
their own income.5
Individuals choose whether to become entrepreneurs or workers. A worker earns
the market determined wage, wt, which is not firm specific and independent of ability.
Hence, the wage of high and low ability workers is identical. An entrepreneur creates
a firm and earns that firm’s profits, π.
5Note that the model could easily be extended to the case in which the individual’s utility depends
on the income of grand-children, grand-grand-children and so on. However, apart from complicating
the model, this will merely change things quantitatively, but not change the underlying qualitative
results.
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where rt = log of the level of technology, χi,t = chosen level of innovation, wt = wage,
li,t = labour and ai,t ∈ (1,∞) is the business outcome and relates to the entrepreneur’s
(or firm’s) productivity and is the realisation of a Pareto distributed random variable




0 if a < 1
θi,ta





αi − βi,t ≥ 1. (4)
The parameter βi,t is given by




where γi = {0 if j = w, 1 if j = e}, αi = {0 if k = l, 0 < α < 1 if k = h} and gt−1 is
the growth rate of technology in the previous period i.e. rt = rt−1 + gt−1. Hence, βi,t
reflects all the positive or negative effects on productivity an entrepreneur faces either
due to social background (which is reflected by γi) or ability (reflected by αi).
The relative sizes of αi and γi reflect the relative returns to ability and background
respectively. γi is normalised to 1 when j = e. α is determined by the institutions
prevalent in the economy. For example, α will be higher in an economy with high qual-
ity, free public education than in an economy with poor quality or no public education.
This model is not qualitatively different from that presented by Hassler and Ro-
driguez Mora (2000). This set up makes it far easier do derive an explicit expression
for the wage rate which will become the focus of attention later on in the paper.
We can see that the advantage an entrepreneur has due to social background is
decreasing in the growth rate, while the advantage due to ability is independent of the
growth rate. As mentioned earlier, part of the advantage of having entrepreneurs as
parents might be skills directly passed on from parents to their children. However, in
a rapidly changing world of high growth the necessary skillset changes very quickly as
well and so skills passed on from parents to their children are less useful.
Individuals choose to become an entrepreneur or a worker at the ex-ante stage, i.e.
before the realisation of ai,t.
An entrepreneur will maximise expected profits with respect to his two choice vari-
ables, labour input li,t and innovation level χi,t. Applying expectations to the profit
6














As can be seen labour demand of entrepreneurs is independent of ai,t.
















Entrepreneurs of type {e,h} clearly make the highest expected profits and type
{w,l} the lowest. At low growth rates, type {e,l} have an advantage over type {w,h}.
This position is reversed when the rate of growth is high. Let the threshold growth
rate where types {e,l} and {w,h} make equally good entrepreneurs be denoted by g∗.
Innovation increases the maximum possible profit but also increases the variance of
profits through the parameter θi,t.
The first order condition with respect to innovation yields the profit maximising
level of innovation
χi,t = αi. (10)
The level of innovation by an entrepreneur is independent of his social background.
Entrepreneurs with high ability innovate more than entrepreneurs with low ability.
Therefore, we assume the growth rate to be depending positively on the proportion





where mt is the total number of entrepreneurs and m
h
t is the number of high ability en-
trepreneurs at time t. The growth rate is higher in an allocation where only high ability
individuals become entrepreneurs. An increase in the proportion of entrepreneurs who
are high ability has an effect on the growth rate similar to that of increasing the level
of human capital used in research in the Romer (1990) model of endogenous growth.
Having established optimal decisions of entrepreneurs, their (expected) profits and
how the growth rate depends on the types of entrepreneurs, let us now focus our
attention on the individual’s decision whether to become an entrepreneur or a worker
in the first place.
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Let wj,k,t be the wage at which an individual of type {j,k} is indifferent between






















When zt is low, everyone prefers to be an entrepreneur. As zt rises, type {w,l} are
the first and type {e,h} are the last to choose to be workers. Whether type {w,h} or
type {e,l} prefer to be workers first as zt rises depends on gt−1. As defined earlier, let
g∗ be the growth rate at which zw,h,t = ze,l,t. Using our definition for β given by (5)





g∗ is positive for α < 0.56. Intuitively, if g > g∗, then high ability children of
workers would make higher expected profits than low ability children of entrepreneurs
if they chose to become entrepreneurs and vice versa for g < g∗.
Equilibrium conditions
There are two conditions that must hold for the economy to be in equilibrium. First,
given the allocation of entrepreneurs and workers, the labour market must clear. Sec-
ond, given the wage established in the labour market, utility maximising individuals
choose their occupations optimally.
Combining optimal labour demand given in (7) with optimal innovation levels for
the different types of entrepreneurs given by (10), we can say that aggregate labour
demand as a function of the real wage zt =
wt














where the first part is aggregate labour demand by high ability entrepreneurs and the
second aggregate labour demand by low ability entrepreneurs.
Aggregate labour supply is given by
ls(zt) = 1−mht −mlt, (16)
which depends on the real wage, because the numbers of entrepreneurs mht and m
l
t
depend on the real wage.
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After some basic simplification solving ld(zt) = l














t is a step function such that
mt = 1 if zt < zw,l,t and mt = 0 if zt > ze,h,t. The discontinuities occur at the wage
where one type {j,k} is indifferent between occupations.
Suppose that the economy is initially in a steady state such that g < g∗. This is a
world of low social mobility since only types {e,h} and {e,l} can be entrepreneurs. To be
in a steady state equilibrium, we require the number of entrepreneurs to be constant,
mt−1 = mt = m.6 There is one segment of the mt (zt) function where mt−1 = mt,
marked by a thicker line in figure 1. This is where all children of entrepreneurs become
entrepreneurs in the next period. The intersection of zt(mt) andmt(zt) can by definition
not be at another part of the stepwise function mt(zt) as the number of entrepreneurs
would be increasing if the intersection was to the left and decreasing if it was to the
right of the thick area. This case is depicted in figure 1 below.
Figure 1: g < g∗, low social mobility
If g > g∗, there are three possible steady state allocations of individuals: types
{e,h} and {w,h} are entrepreneurs; type {e,h} and a constant fraction of type {w,h}
6In general, in terms of notation, I use x as the steady state value for the variable xt.
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are entrepreneurs; types {e,h} and {w,h} and a constant fraction of type {e,l} are
entrepreneurs. Which steady state prevails depends on the value of q. The segments
of the mt (zt) function where mt−1 = mt are marked by a thicker line in figure 2.
Figure 2: g > g∗, high social mobility
2.1 Reprogenetic Technology
At some time s, the technology increasing the probability of a child being high ability
from q to q′ becomes available at cost cs. Any parent may choose to invest, as long as
their income exceeds the cost since we do not allow for borrowing in this economy. The
results about who finds it optimal to make use of the technology, growth and social
mobility will depend on whether we are in a low or high social mobility economy. Let
us first consider the scenario in which the economy is initially in a low mobility steady
state.
2.1.1 Low Social Mobility Economy
Consider an economy initially in a steady state such that g < g∗, i.e. low social mobility,
before the introduction of the reprogenetic technology at time s. As shown earlier, at
time s+ 1 only types {e,h} and {e,l} will be entrepreneurs, so only entrepreneurs have
10
an incentive to invest. Entrepreneurs at t will find it optimal to invest if the expected
benefit of the investment outweighs the costs, which we can write as:
δ(q′ − q)E{πe,h,t+1 − πe,l,t+1} > ct. (18)
The expected benefit from making use of the reprogenetic technology is that the
entrepreneur’s child is more likely to be of high ability and hence derive larger profits.
Since the child’s payoff enters the entrepreneur’s utility function adjusted with δ we
get the above equation.

















This equation (19) can be thought of as the entrepreneurs incentive compatibility con-
straint for investing.
However, parents can only invest if their profits exceed the cost, πe,k,t > ct, which
can be thought of as the participation constraint. This proportion of type {e,k} that
invests is given by:
λe,k,t = Pr (πe,k,t > ct) . (20)










Finally, using the equilibrium wage defined by (17), the proportion of type {e,k} that





















Assume that the cost ct is constant over time in nominal terms, i.e. ct = c. Invest-
ment by parents increases the number of high ability entrepreneurs in the next period,
which increases demand for labour and pushes up wages. Since in a world of low social
mobility only children of entrepreneurs can become entrepreneurs in the next period,
i.e. mt is fixed, then the real wage,
wt

















and gt−1 ≤ α, the left hand side of
equation (19) increases as rt increases. Even if the technology is very costly when first
introduced, eventually equation (18) will be satisfied as rt rises and the “real” cost of
the technology falls.
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Intuitively, assuming that the nominal cost for the reprogenetic technology remains
constant over time implies that the real costs of it decreases over time since productivity
is increasing. When entrepreneurs make the decision about whether to invest into
their child’s genetic component of ability what matters is how profits compare to c.
Hence, over time the fraction of investors will increase until it finally reaches one. This
assumption is not entirely realistic, however the cost of high-tech goods or services
such as computers, air travel or IVF treatment does tend to fall in real terms over
time. Even if the cost was increasing over time in nominal terms, as long as it is falling
in real terms (even if it is very slowly) the economy will converge to the steady states
described in this paper.
Using our results about who invests in a world of low social mobility we can say
that the growth rate, defined in (11), is given by
gt =
q + λe,l,t−1 (q′ − q)
1− (q′ − q) (λe,h,t−1 − λe,l,t−1)
α (23)
We can also say that gt approaches q
′α as λe,h,t−1 and λe,l,t−1 approach 1.
Interestingly, if q′α > g∗ = 1αeα −1, then as more entrepreneurs invest, the economy
will eventually reach the point where the growth rate of technology is high enough that
entrepreneurs of type {w,h} have higher expected profits than entrepreneurs of type
{e,l} and the economy switches to the high social mobility state. So, for α low enough
the introduction of the reprogenetic technology can sufficiently increase growth over
time and turn a low social mobility economy into a high social mobility economy for
given institutional factors. This result is surprising as a common criticism of such a
technology is that it would widen gaps between “haves” and “have nots” and make it
increasingly difficult for “have nots” to improve their social and economic status and
this result shows that actually exactly the opposite could happen.










Consider an increase in the proportion of entrepreneurs who are high ability such
















Thus an increase in the proportion of high ability entrepreneurs, who demand more
labour, raises the level of the wage. Additionally, since rt = rt−1 + gt−1, the resulting
increase in the growth rate increases the growth rate of wages. This resembles the
models from the literature on ’trickle down’ such as Aghion and Bolton (1997).
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2.1.2 High Social Mobility Economy
There are three possible steady state allocations of entrepreneurs and workers in the
high social mobility economy: types {e, h} and {w, h} are entrepreneurs; type {e, h}
and a proportion ψw,h of type {w, h} are entrepreneurs; types {e, h}, {w, h} and a
proportion ψe,l of type {e, l} are entrepreneurs.
Adjusting our incentive compatibility constraint (18) to this setting, we can say
that entrepreneurs will want to invest at time t if:
δ(q′ − q) {E [πe,h,t+1]− ψe,l,t+1E [πe,l,t+1]− (1− ψe,l,t+1)wt+1} > ct. (26)
Since in a steady state where 0 < ψe,l < 1, type {e, l} are indifferent between being
entrepreneurs or workers, i.e. the expected profit of an entrepreneur of type {e, l}
equals the wage, the above equation simplifies to:
δ(q′ − q) {E [πe,h,t+1]− wt+1} > ct. (27)
In the world of high social mobility workers might also find it optimal to invest
into their child’s genetic ability, since children of workers can become entrepreneurs
and being of high ability is beneficial to entrepreneurs. Workers will choose to invest
if the increase in the child’s expected income due to an increase in the probability of
becoming an entrepreneur and hence derive the profits of a high ability entrepreneur
rather than a worker is sufficiently large. Hence, workers want to invest if:
δ(q′ − q)ψw,h,t+1 {E [πw,h,t+1]− wt+1)} > ct. (28)
Since the left hand side of equation (25) is greater than the left hand side of equation
(26) and hence the constraint is stricter for workers, one of the following occurs:
• All entrepreneurs and workers invest
• Entrepreneurs and a proportion of workers invest
• All entrepreneurs but no workers invest
• Only a proportion of entrepreneurs invest
• Nobody invests
Since the “real” cost of investment is falling over time, eventually any parent wanting
to invest will be able to do so and the economy will converge to one of the following
steady states, provided g > g∗, which we are going to analyse case by case.
1. Steady state when types {e, h} and {w, h} are entrepreneurs
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This case of a high social mobility economy in which all high ability individuals, whether
they are children of workers or entrepreneurs, become entrepreneurs and no low ability
individuals become entrepreneurs is summarised in figure 3 below.
Figure 3: g > g∗, high ability individuals are entrepreneurs
Let φe be the fraction of entrepreneurs who invest and φw be the fraction of workers
who invest, where we know that 0 ≤ φw ≤ φe ≤ 1.
Using this, we can write the number of entrepreneurs in steady state as:
m =
q + φw (q
′ − q)
1− (φe − φw) (q′ − q)
. (29)
Using the steady state value for m and mh we can see that the growth rate in this






The existence of this steady state requires that α > g∗ = 1αeα − 1 as our condition for
the high social mobility economy.
The wage in this steady state is:
w = ert+α
(
q + φw (q
′ − q)




The wage is increasing in q, q′, φe and φw, since higher values of any of these vari-
ables increase the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs, pushing up demand for labour.
Higher values of α increase the growth rate, labour productivity and therefore wages.
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Expected profits for both types are decreasing in q, q′, φe and φw, due to the positive
effect on wages of an increase in any of these variables. Since both types are high ability,
expected profits for both are increasing in α which represents the return to ability.
This steady state furthermore requires that E [πw,h] > w, so that high ability chil-





q + φw (q
′ − q)
1− q − φe (q′ − q)
)
(34)






q + φw (q
′ − q)
1− q − φe (q′ − q)
)
. (35)
2. Type {e, h} and a proportion ψw,h of type {w, h} are entrepreneurs
This case of a high social mobility economy in which all high ability children of workers
and some high ability children of workers become entrepreneurs, is summarised in figure
4 below.
Figure 4: g > g∗, {e, h} and some {w, h} are entrepreneurs
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Since type {w, h} are indifferent between being entrepreneurs and workers in this
steady state, the left hand side of equation (26) equals zero, so no workers will invest.
The number of entrepreneurs in steady state is:
m =
ψw,hq
1− (1− ψw,h) q − φe (q′ − q)
(36)
Since all entrepreneurs are of high ability (but not vice versa like in the first case) the
steady state growth rate is the same as in the previous case and given by:
g = α. (37)
Again, for the economy to be in the state of high social mobility, the existence of
this steady state requires that α > g∗ = 1αeα − 1.








Since ψw,h is endogenous, changes in q, q
′, φe, φw and α, do not affect the wage, only
the value of ψw,h. This can be seen as a shift in the mt(zt) line. Only if the changes
are so large that the economy moves to an equilibrium as described in case 1, will the
wage change.


























Again, changes in q, q′, φe and φw are absorbed by changes in ψw,h. Wages and
therefore expected profits are unaffected, unless the changes are large enough that the
economy switches to an equilibrium where all individuals of type {e, h} and {e, h} are
entrepreneurs. Changes in α do not affect wages in this case but do affect labour
productivity. Intuitively an increase in α increases labour productivity in firms owned
by high ability entrepreneurs, and therefore increases expected profits of both type
{e, h} and {w, h}.
The existence of this steady state allocation requires that E [πw,h] = w, so that







1− q − φe (q′ − q)
)
(41)
3. Types {e, h}, {w, h} and a proportion ψe,l of type {e, l} are entrepreneurs
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The case of a high social mobility economy in which all high ability children and some
low ability children of entrepreneurs become entrepreneurs, is summarised in figure 5
below.
Figure 5: g > g∗, {e, h}, {w, h} and a proportion and some {e, l} are entrepreneurs
The number of entrepreneurs in steady state is:
m =
q + φw (q
′ − q)
1− (φe − φw) (q′ − q)− ψe,l [1− q − φe (q′ − q)]
(42)










Hence the steady state growth rate g = αm
h










The growth rate is increasing in q, q′, φe since the number of high ability entrepreneurs,
who innovate more, is increasing in these variables. An increase in the proportion of
type {e, l} who are entrepreneurs in equilibrium, ψe,l, decreases the proportion of en-
trepreneurs who are high ability, lowering the average level of innovation and decreasing
the growth rate.




′ − q)][e2α − ψe,l[1− q − φe(q′ − q)](e2α − 1)]





Similarly to case 2, changes in q, q′, φe and αare absorbed by changes in ψe,l, unless
the changes are so large that the economy shifts to an equilibrium as in case 1.
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(1− ψe,l) (1− q − φe (q′ − q))




Since wages are unaffected by small changes in q, q′, φe, profits are also unaffected. As
in case 2, an increase in α increases labour productivity in firms owned by high ability
entrepreneurs, and therefore increases expected profits of types {e, h}, {w, h} but not
of type {e, l}.
The existence of this steady state allocation requires that E [πe,l] = w, so that low






[q + φw (q
′ − q)]
[




(1− ψe,l) (1− q − φe (q′ − q))
)
(49)
Which steady state allocation the economy converges to depends on the real wage
function. Higher values of α, q, q′ φe and φw all raise the wage for a given number of
entrepreneurs, reducing the number of entrepreneurs in steady state.
3 Conclusion
Starting from a low social mobility steady state, investment in technology which in-
creases the probability of a parent producing a high ability child increases the number
of high ability entrepreneurs in the economy. This increases wages since high ability
entrepreneurs hire more labour and increases the growth rate since high ability en-
trepreneurs innovate more. This increase in the growth rate reduces the advantage
inherited from parents who are entrepreneurs relative to the advantage of being high
ability. If the growth rate is sufficiently high, the economy will switch into a high social
18
mobility allocation. In the high mobility economy, investment by parents increases the
wage rate and reduces profits of entrepreneurs. Once the economy has switched from a
low mobility to a high mobility steady state it will stay there, even if nobody invests.
We have therefore seen that contrary to popular belief a technology enabling parental
investment into the genetic component of their child’s ability can enhance not only eco-
nomic growth but also social mobility even if parents cannot borrow. Positive effects
with regards to a potential increase are self-enforcing in the sense that social mobility is
increasing in growth and growth is increasing in parental investment into innate ability.
Overall, because it increases growth, this technology reduces the relative importance of
social background compared to innate ability and hence can enhance social mobility.
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This paper summarises and critiques the literature on the effects of migration
on wages.
1 Introduction
This first section of this paper addresses the potential problems with estimating the
effect of immigration on wages and offers possible ways around these problems. Section
two compares the literature surrounding the effect on immigration on wages focusing on
papers which use a methodology other than cross-city comparisons. The final section
discusses high-skilled migration driven endogenous technological change, a branch of
the literature which is relatively new and not much studied.
Card (2009) includes a fairly comprehensive review of the literature on the effect
of immigration on the distribution of wages in the US, focusing on papers using cross
city comparisons. This paper is supportive of the conclusions drawn by Card (2009)
and extends the literature review to include more recent papers that employ a different
methodology including one which focuses on the UK labour market. Additionally, I
will relate the literature on immigration to the literature on productivity externalities
and endogenous technical change.
2 Potential problems when estimating the effect of immi-
gration on wages
2.1 Problems with cross city or cross state comparisons
Much of the literature on the effect of immigration on wages tends to focus on cross city
or cross state comparisons. There are a number of problems with such analysis. Firstly,
immigrants may not be randomly distributed across labour markets. Rather, they may
20
endogenously be located in in cities or states with thriving economies. In this case,
such studies are likely to find a spurious positive correlation between immigration and
wages. Secondly, natives may take their labour out of a local labour market in response
to immigration flows, offsetting any wage effects. For example, Borjas, Freeman and
Katz (1997) find that the native flow of labour to California has been greatly reduced
by the influx of immigrants since 1970. As a result, immigration affects every city or
state, not only the ones receiving immigrants.
A potential solution to the endogenous allocation of immigrants is to use instru-
mental variables estimation. A standard instrument in the literature which has been
used in various studies following Altonji and Card (1991) is the settlement pattern of
previous immigrants. A number of studies including Bartel (1989) and Munshi (2003)
show that settlement patterns of previous immigrants are a key determinant of immi-
grants location decisions. Estimation in differences can be used to eliminate location
specific fixed effects that are correlated with both immigrant settlement patterns and
economic conditions.
The problem of reallocation of natives can be reduced by using large regional defini-
tions making it more likely that any movements will be internalised. Card (2001) offers
a methodology for testing how sensitive mobility flows of natives and earlier migrants
are to inflows of new immigrants. This methodology involves estimating the following
equation
yic = Zjcβ + γRjc + dj + θc + ejc (1)
where yic is a component of population growth for skill group j in city c e.g. the
outmigration rate of natives. Zjc is a set of group level characteristics, dj is a skill
group dummy, θc is a city dummy, Rjc is the inflow rate of immigrants in occupation
group j to city c, and ejc is an error term.
It is possible that unobserved city and skill group specific shocks may attract recent
immigrants as well as reduce the outflow of natives and earlier immigrants. To get
around this, Card uses settlement pattern of previous immigrants as an instrument for






where Mg is the total number of immigrants from source country g who arrived in the
US between 1985 and 1990. λgc is the fraction of immigrants from an earlier cohort
from country g who live in city c. τgj is the fraction of immigrants from country g
who arrived between 1985 and 1990 and who are in skill group j. This measure is
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independent of any occupation specific shocks in city c as long as Mg, λgc, and τgj are
all independent of any occupation specific shocks in city c.
Card (2001) estimates the effect of immigration flows on the inflows and outflows
of natives and earlier immigrants by skill group for the 175 largest US cities during
the period 1985-90 and finds that the estimates for γ are mostly small and statistically
insignificant. It is important to note that Card is measuring the average effect of
immigration flows on native migration flows across cities. These results should not be
generalised to other time periods and may not hold when looking at more specific groups
of cities such as cities in California. This methodology may be useful to check if region
size is large enough that movements of natives in response to inflows of immigrants are
internalised.
2.2 Skill downgrading
When estimating a model that relates changes in relative wages to migration flows of
particular skill or experience groups, one potential problem is that immigrants tend to
“downgrade” upon arrival in a foreign labour market. According to Dustmann, Frattini,
and Preston (2013), immigrants tend to be found lower down in the wage distribution
than one would predict based on their measured skill and experience levels. Possible
explanations for this include discrimination by employers or differing productivities in
the same jobs due to language difficulties or cultural differences.
Using UK labour force survey data from 2004-2005, Dustmann et al. find that
recent immigrants i.e. those who arrived within two years of the interview are dispro-
portionately represented in the lower occupational categories despite being on average
much better educated than natives. 47 percent of recent immigrants are in the lowest
three occupational categories compared to 27 percent of natives. However they are also
slightly better represented than natives in the highest occupational category, higher
managerial and professional occupations (16 percent versus 15 percent).
Looking at this data it becomes apparent that after arrival immigrants “upgrade”,
that is they move higher up the wage distribution perhaps as their language skill im-
prove or they accumulate human or social capital complimentary to their existing skills.
Dustmann et al. find that earlier immigrants i.e. those who arrived more than two
years prior to the interview, are underrepresented compared to natives in all but the top
two occupational categories. They are equally well represented in the second category
(lower managerial and professional occupations) at around 31 percent, and overrep-
resented in the highest category (22 percent versus 15 percent). These findings are
mirrored by Eckstein and Weiss (2004), who look at data on the wages of natives and
immigrants in Israel and find evidence of considerable skill downgrading on arrival,
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following which wages of immigrants approach, but do not converge to, the wages of
natives.
This skill downgrading and subsequent upgrading has important consequences for
the estimation of the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives. If
recent immigrants who downgrade upon arrival are classified into skill groups according
to their education and experience levels, this misclassification would suggest that there
are more immigrants working in higher occupation categories than is actually the case.
The estimated wage for immigrants in higher occupation categories would be lower than
the true wage since many of these immigrants are actually working in lower occupational
categories. This leads to a downward bias in estimates of the elasticity of substitution
of immigrants and natives. This estimation error is worse when using data with smaller
time intervals. For example, when measuring the changes in the number of immigrants
and in relative wages of immigrants over a 10 year period, the misclassification error
will be much smaller than when measuring changes in the same variables over a two
year period since upgrading after arrival means that fewer immigrants are misclassified
in the 10 year model.
To get around the problem of skill downgrading by immigrants, one strategy would
be to use data aggregated such that the time periods are defined as decades rather
than years. This does not completely get rid of the downward bias in estimates of the
substitutability of immigrants and natives but it would minimise it. Another approach,
as in Dustmann et al. (2013), is to allocate immigrants to skill groups according to
their observed position in the income distribution rather than their levels of education
or experience, more details of which will follow in the next section.
3 A summary of the literature on the effect of immigra-
tion on wages
In light of the problems with cross-city comparisons discussed above, this section will
focus on other methodologies for investigating the effect of immigration on wages. There
is a distinct lack of consensus in the literature surrounding the effects of immigration
on wages. Borjas (2003) uses US population data from 1960 to 2001 and finds that
immigration lowers the wages of competing workers; a 10 percent increase in the supply
of labour reduces wages by 3 to 4 percent, depending on education and experience
level. Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012)
examine the impact of immigration on the wages of native workers for the US and UK
respectively and find that it is very small.
Borjas (2003) sorts workers according to education level and labour market experi-
ence. Workers are classified into four distinct education groups: high school dropout,
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high school graduates, workers with some college education, and college graduates.
The data is aggregated into five-year experience intervals to group workers with similar
levels of experience together. Aggregate production is modelled using a 3-level CES
production technology which allows technology to be summarised in terms of three
elasticities of substitution: between capital and labour, between workers of different
education levels and between workers in different labour market experience groups.








where Q is output, K is capital, L is aggregate labour input. υ = 1− 1σKL where σKL
is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. −∞ < υ ≤ 1, λKt + λLt =











where Lit is the number of workers with education i at time t and ρ = 1 − 1σE where
σE is the elasticity of substitution across different education aggregates. −∞ < ρ ≤ 1,∑













where Lijt is the number of workers with experience level j in education class i. η =
1 − 1σx+ where σx is the elasticity of substitution across experience classes within an
education group.
∑
j αij = 1.
Borjas takes the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour to be 1 and
estimates the elasticities of substitution between workers with different education levels
and between workers with different experience levels. These estimates are then used to
simulate the effects of immigration to the US between 1980 and 2000 on wages of workers
by skill and education group. Note that capital is assumed to be inelastically supplied.
The elasticity of substitution between workers in different education groups does not
depend on which education groups are being compared i.e. it is the same between high
school dropout and high school graduates as between high school dropouts and college
graduates. Similarly the elasticity of substitution between workers with different levels
of experience is the same whether these workers differ by 5 years of experience or 25.
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) perform a similar exercise but allow for the possibility of
imperfect substitution between immigrants and natives within the same education and
24
experience group. The degree of imperfect substitutability has important implications
since it affects the impact immigration has on wages of natives with similar education
and experience. Smaller substitutability means that the arrival of immigrants of a
particular skill and experience group affects the wages of earlier immigrants more than
the wages of natives. The authors find a small but significant degree of imperfect
substitutability between immigrant and native workers within the same education and
experience group. Their estimated substitution elasticity is around 20. Even this small
degree of imperfect substitutability makes a significant difference when simulating the
effect of immigration on native wages. When they allow the elasticity to vary across
education groups, their estimate is significantly lower among less educated workers
(around 11.1).
These estimates, combined with other estimated elasticities, imply that immigration
to the US between 1990 and 2006 had a small positive effect on average native wages
(+0.6%) and a larger negative effect (-6.7%) on wages of previous immigrants with the
effect. This is not necessarily inconsistent with Card (2001) who finds that immigration
during the 1980s reduced the wages of low-skilled natives in traditional gateway cities
such as Miami and Los Angeles by 1-3 percent. It is possible that immigrants to the
cities studied by Card during the 1980s may be disproportionately low-skilled compared
to immigrants to the country as a whole between 1990 and 2006. In this case, low-
skilled immigration flows to these cities may depress the wages of natives even if natives
and immigrants are not perfect substitutes.
Unlike Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2012) focus on the effect on wages in the
long run after capital has fully adjusted to the labour supply shock due to the inflow of
foreign-born workers. They assume that in the long run the economy follows a balanced
growth path along which the real interest rate and aggregate capital-output ratio are
both constant while the capital-labour ratio grows at a constant rate. This is consistent
with data since the real return to capital and the capital-output ratio in the US do
not show any long run trend, and the capital-labour ratio grows at a constant rate.
This implies that the average wage does not depend on labour supply and therefore
immigration in the long run. However immigration can still have distributional effects if
different types of labour are imperfect substitutes and the composition of the immigrant
population differs from that of the native population in terms of education and/or
labour market experience.
As in Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2012) use a three-level CES production
technology. Imposing such a structure is restrictive since it relies on assumptions about
the nesting structure and imposes assumptions about the separability of inputs. The
authors reduce this problem by testing the empirical fit of four alternative specifications
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of the production technology. Model A an augmented version of that in Borjas (2003)
allowing for imperfect substitutability between US and foreign born workers with equal
education and experience. Model B sorts workers into two broad education classes
rather than four: workers with at least some college education and workers with high
school education or less. Model C allows for the elasticity of substitution across broad
experience groups to differ from the elasticity of substitution across narrow experience
groups. Model D is as in model A, but the nesting order of education and experience
is reversed.
Using data from the Current Population Survey, the sample is large enough to
estimate separately the elasticity of substitution between broad education groups and
between narrow education groups. These are found to be quite different from each
other with the former estimated to be around 2 and the latter above 10. Since workers
within broad education groups are estimated to be close substitutes the data suggest
that model B should be preferred. Choice of model B over any model with four distinct
education groups significantly alters estimation of the effect of immigration on the
wages of workers in the lowest education groups. This is because, according to Card
(2009), US immigrants are disproportionately represented in the high school dropout
education group (31 percent versus 11 percent for natives).
Card (2009) uses data from the 2005/6 American Community Survey to calculate
the proportions of the immigrant and native populations that are high school equiv-
alents in the two education group model. It is assumed that each dropout supplies
0.7 units of high school labour and half of workers with some college education supply
1.2 units of high school labour. The other half supplies 0.8 units of college equivalent
labour. This results in similar proportions of the immigrant and native populations
that are high school equivalents (63 percent versus 59 percent). In the four education
group model, immigration significantly increases the proportion of high school dropouts
in the labour force, lowering their wage relative to other education groups. In the two
education group model, immigration does not have a significant effect on the propor-
tion of high school equivalents so their relative wage does not change significantly. A
number of papers attempt to estimate the inverse elasticity of substitution between
different education groups in a four skill group model. The results are not consistent
between papers, for example Raphael and Ronconi (2008) estimate the elasticity to
be close to 0 while Borjas (2003) reports two estimates, 0.74 and 0.76 with standard
errors of 0.65 and 0.58 respectively. Card (2009) conjectures that the inconsistency
and imprecision of these estimates is because the four skill group model is misspecified.
This supports the finding by Ottaviano and Peri (2012) that the two skill group model
is a better fit for the data than the four skill group model.
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Manning, Manacorda and Wadsworth (2012) use UK wage and employment data
from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s to study the impact of immigration on wages.
Their approach is very similar to Ottaviano and Peri (2012) in that they use a three-
level CES production function using as inputs two types of labour: skilled and unskilled.
They allow for imperfect substitution between immigrants and natives and between
labour from different age or education groups. The baseline estimate for the elasticity
of substitution between immigrants and natives in a given age-education group is 7.81,
which is lower than that found by Ottaviano and Peri. When they estimate this elas-
ticity for recent (less than 5 years) and long-term immigrants separately, they estimate
a higher degree of substitutability for immigrants who arrived earlier (10.1 versus 4.6).
Additionally, the authors find that the degree of substitutability is increasing in the
age of immigrants (7.5 for those aged 26-35, 12.7 for those aged 36-50, and 90.9 for those
aged 51 to 60). A possible reason for the higher estimate for the degree of substitution
in the US is that Ottaviano and Peri use between-census i.e long-run changes in wages
to form their estimates. Given that migrants become more substitutable with natives
the longer they have been in the country, as confirmed by Manacorda, Manning and
Wadsworth’s estimates, this could explain, at least in part, the difference between the
UK and US estimates. Alternatively, as explained earlier, skill downgrading by recent
immigrants biases estimates of the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and
natives downwards. The differences in the two estimates could be due to a larger degree
of downgrading in the UK compared to the US (Dustmann, Frattini and Preston, 2011)
or it could be due to the use of decennial census data for the US but data grouped
into 5 year intervals for the UK. As explained earlier, shorter time periods between
observations are likely to bias the estimation downwards more strongly.
Based on their estimates of the various elasticities of substitution, Manacorda et al
simulate the effect of migration to the UK between 1975 and 2005 on wages of different
groups. They find that the only sizeable effect of immigration to the UK over the last
30 years was on the wages of university educated immigrants. Given fixed demand for
labour, these estimates imply a fall in the wages of university educated immigrants on
the order of 0.8 percentage points per year over the 30 year period. They conclude that
due to imperfect substitution of natives and immigrants, the main impact of increased
immigration in the UK is on the wages of immigrants who are already there.
In light of Ottaviano and Peri’s higher estimate of the substitutability between im-
migrants and natives, which is consistent with the estimate by Card (2009), Manacorda
et al. recomputed their estimates of the effect of immigration on wages using a value
of the elasticity of substitution of 21 instead of 7. Using this new value, they still find
that the effect of increased immigration was largely concentrated among immigrants.
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Wages of university educated immigrants were reduced by 0.36 percentage points per
year while wages of university educated natives were reduced by less than a quarter of
this. As before, there was no effect on workers with only a secondary school education
whether they are natives or immigrants.
Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2013) analyse the effect of immigration on native
workers. Rather than measure the effects on wages of different types of labour like
the papers discussed above, they focus on the effect of immigration on the wages of
native workers along the native wage distribution. Their approach avoids pre-allocating
immigrants to skill categories thus avoiding the misclassification problem caused by
skill downgrading of immigrants as discussed above. Their analysis is based on a
simple model where output, y, is produced using multiple labour types according to
the following nested CES production function where labour supplied by the ith type is
li and capital used is K:










αi represents the productivity of the ith type of labour and σ ≤ 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between labour types. β determines the relative productivity of labour
and capital and s ≤ 1 determines the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour.
Native and immigrant labour of the same type are perfect substitutes and equally
productive. Note that since labour types are not defined according to age or education
levels, this does not mean that natives and labour in a given education-age group are
perfect substitutes. Dustmann et al. show that if capital is supplied perfectly elastically
and capital and labour are perfect substitutes, then the effects of immigration on the
native wage distribution depend on the relative density of immigrants and natives
along that distribution. The wage of a skill type at a point in the distribution where the
relative density of immigrants is above an appropriately weighted average of the relative
density across the whole distribution will be decreased by immigration. Similarly skill
types located at a point in the distribution where immigration density is below an
appropriately weighted average will experience a wage increase. As long as capital is
at least fairly mobile and immigrant labour is sufficiently different to native labour, it
is possible that mean native wages will rise as a consequence of immigration. However
those workers who are competing with immigrants will experience a wage fall.
The equation estimated is:
∆lnWprt = βt + ∆cprt + γp∆mrt + ∆εprt (8)
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where Wprt denotes the pth percentile of the native wage distribution in region r at
time t. βt is a vector of time dummies, and ∆cprt measures changes in the average
age of immigrant and native workers in the region as well as the ratio of high to low
educated workers. ∆mrt measures the change in the ratio of immigrants to natives in
region r and the parameter γp is a combination of the elasticity of substitution between
different skill groups and the relative density of immigrants at that part of the native
wage distribution. εprt is an error term. The authors divide Great Britain in to 17
regions and after testing using methodology as in Card (2001), claim that the resulting
size of regions is large enough that endogenous migration of natives is likely to be
contained within these regions. The above equation is estimated using OLS and twice
using instrumental variables. The first IV estimation instruments the change in the
ratio of immigrants to natives using the 1991 ratio from the Census of Population, the
second instruments this ratio using four period lags from the Labour Force Survey.
Both IV estimates and the OLS estimate suggest that immigration has had a neg-
ative effect on wages at or below the 10th percentile and a positive effect on wages
further up the distribution. Estimates using as an instruments the 4 period lag of the
immigrant to native ratio indicate that an inflow of immigrants equal to 1 percent of
the native population would lead to a 0.67 percent decrease in native wages at the 5th
percentile, a 0.66 percent increase in the median native wage, a 0.41 percent increase in
native wages at the 90th percentile and a 0.47 percent increase in mean native wages.
Estimates using the immigrant concentration from the 1991 Census are similar but
smaller in magnitude: -0.34 percent, 0.44 percent, 0.34 percent and 0.26 percent. The
authors claim that these results, although modest, are too large to be explained by an
immigration surplus.
The idea that immigrants and natives are not perfect substitutes within skill groups,
as proposed by Ottaviano and Peri and Manacorda et al., could explain the positive
effect of immigration on mean native wages. Imperfect substitutability between im-
migrants and natives implies that an increase in the immigrant labour force increases
native marginal productivity and therefore wages. Other potential explanations de-
pend on immigrants being paid less than the value that they contribute to production,
generating a surplus that gets paid to native labour if capital is supplied elastically.
Borjas (2001) suggests that cost of internal migration, both geographic and sectoral,
prevent native labour from reallocating fully in response to economic signals. In this
case immigration may realise efficiency gains.
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4 Productivity externalities
The papers discussed in the previous section do not take into account the possibility that
high-skilled migration is an engine for endogenous technological change. Grossmann
and Stadelmann (2013) argue that international migration of high-skilled workers leads
to productivity effects that raise the wage rate of high-skilled workers in host countries
and lower the wage rate of high-skilled workers in source countries. Grossmann and
Stadelmann use data on international bilateral migration flows to examine the effect of
an increase in high-skilled migration rates on GDP per capita, total factor productivity
(TFP) and wages of high-skilled workers between pairs of source and destination coun-
tries. They theorise that for a given TFP, diminishing marginal productivity means
that high-skilled migration lowers the wages of skilled workers in the destination coun-
try and raises the wages of high-skilled workers in the source country. However, the
effect on TFP (positive in the destination country, negative in the source country) has
the opposite effect. The overall effect on the wages of high skilled workers is therefore
ambiguous in theory.
Their model considers two economies, home and foreign. There is a homogenous
consumption good and output Y is produced competitively according to the production
function
Y = AF (H,L) ≡ ALf(k) (9)
F is a constant returns to scale function, H and L denote high and low-skilled labour
input, A is total factor productivity, k ≡ HL denotes the skill intensity of production and
f is an increasing, concave function. Higher concentrations of skilled labour, h = HL+H ,
exert a positive externality on TFP
A = a(h) (10)
where is an increasing function. This human capital externality could be due to learning
spillover effects across workers, increased innovation activity or better institutional
quality associated with a high average skill level of the population.








Let wH and wL be the wages earned workers in the home country and w
∗
H and
w∗L be the wages earned by workers in the foreign country. The cost of migration is
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modelled by a factor which discounts consumption. Utility ui is given by
ui =
{





θi = θH > 1 if i is skilled and θi = θL > 1 if i is unskilled.









The numbers of skilled and unskilled workers are endogenous. Education comes
at time cost ei such that an unskilled individual supplies 1 unit of time to the labour
market and a skilled individual supplies (1− ei) units. Thus utility of individual i born





(1− ei)wH if i is skilled and stays at home,









if i is unskilled and emigrates.
(15)
A non-migrating individual i chooses to become skilled if (1 − ei)wH > wL. All
individuals with ei below an endogenous threshold level, e, become skilled.
e(k) = 1− wL
wH




Since f ′′ < 0, e is decreasing in the skill intensity, k. A higher skill intensity means
that the wage rate of unskilled workers is higher relative to that of skilled workers,
which reduces the number of individuals who choose to become skilled.
The authors show that if the effect of a change in the skill intensity due to migration
on the education decision is small, then an increase in the migration rate of skilled
labour results in a positive effect on TFP of the destination country relative to the
source country. Migration of unskilled labour only affects TFP indirectly via its effect
on education incentives (lowering incentives in the source country and and raising
incentives in the destination country). An increase in the migration rate of unskilled
labour has a positive but small effect on on relative TPF. The effect of an increase in
unskilled migration on the wage of skilled workers in the destination country relative
to the source country is unambiguously positive. An increase in the migration rate of
skilled workers may raise the wages of skilled workers in the destination country relative
to the source country, if the effect on TFP is large enough.
For each country pair (i, j) the authors estimate the following equation where yi is
the outcome variable of interest in country i. This can be GDP per capita, TFP, or a
measure of the wage of high skilled workers. Since data on wage incom eby education
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category is not widely available, the authors use the 80th and 90th percentile as a proxy






= β0 + β1SMigij + β2UMigij + x
′
ijβx + uij (17)
SMigij is high-skilled emigration rate from country i to county j defined as the stock of
skilled emigrants from country i living in country j divided by the stock of residents in
country i. UMigij is the low-skilled emigration rate defined analogously. x
′
ij is a vector
of controls potentially affecting income differences between countries i and j such as
relative school enrolment rates, relative urban population shares, relative investment
rates and source country fixed effects. uij is an error term. If the external effect of high
skilled migration on TPF is large enough to dominate the effect of decreasing marginal
productivity, then we would expect β1 > 0.
The relationship of interest is the effect of high skilled migration on relative GDP,
relative TFP and relative high skilled wages, yet such migration is endogenous and likely
depends on relative wages there is a potential reverse causality problem that needs to be
addressed. The authors focus on the year 2000 with respect to the dependent variable
measures and measure controls other than skilled migration in the year 1990 to reduce
endogeneity bias. In OLS regressions the high-skilled emigration rate in 2000 is replaced
by the rate in 1990. Instrumental variable regressions use the total emigration rate from
country i to country j in 1990 as an instrument for the high skilled emigration rate
from country i to country j in 2000. Additionally the total emigration rate in 1960 is
used as an alternative instrument for SMigij .
Their results indicate that increased high skilled migration has a small but positive
and statistically significant effect on GDP per capita, TFP and wages of high skilled
workers in destination countries relative to source countries. The estimates for the
effect of increased low skilled migration on relative GDP per capita and TFP are not
statistically significant but estimates for the effect of on relative wages at the 80th and
90th percentile are positive, as predicted by the theoretical model, and statistically
significant. If there are indeed positive effects on TFP, as suggested by this paper,
Manacorda et al. (2012) may be too pessimistic about the long-run effect of immigration
on wages since according to Dustmann et al. (2013), immigrants to the UK are on
average much better educated than natives.
The idea that increasing numbers of high-skilled workers spurs technological progress
is similar to the theory of directed technical change proposed by Acemoglu (1998, 2002,
2003, 2007). Technological change does not necessarily affect all sectors or all factors
of the economy in the same way and may be biased towards some sectors or factors.
Acemoglu (2007) shows that if technologies are factor augmenting, an increase in the
supply of a factor induces technological change relatively biased towards that factor i.e.
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an increase in the number of high-skilled workers in an economy incentivises develop-
ment of technology that is complimentary to high-skilled labour. If the technological
bias is sufficiently strong, an increase in the number of high-skilled relative to low-
skilled workers in an economy raises the relative wage of high-skilled workers. This is
in contrast to Grossmann and Stadelmann who construct a model where an increase
in the relative supply of high-skilled workers results in a fall in their wages relative to
the wages of low-skilled workers but do not test this empirically. Their work is focused
on the effects of immigration on the destination country relative to the source country.
An interesting extension to their work would be to look at effects of relative wages of
high and low-skilled workers within a country.
5 Conclusion
Much of the literature on the effect of immigration on wages focuses on cross-city com-
parisons which in most cases do not account for the endogenous allocation of immigrants
or movement of natives. Card (2001) addresses the issue of endogenous movement of
natives and offers a methodology for testing the extent to which natives relocate due
to immigration inflows.
Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2012), and Manacorda et al. (2012) use a
different approach: they first estimate various elasticities of substitution and use these
to simulate the effect of observed migration flows on wages. Ottaviano and Peri and
Manacorda et al. conclude that immigration to the US and the UK respectively has
had little effect on the wages of natives and a substantial negative effect on the wages
of previous immigrants. Borjas, in contrast, finds that immigration lowers the wages of
competing workers. These differences come from the fact that Ottaviano and Peri and
Manacorda et al. allow for imperfect substitution between immigrants and natives, as
supported by Card (2009), and also assume that capital is perfectly elastically supplied
rather than fixed, an assumption that seems reasonable in the long run. Generally the
assumptions made by Ottaviano and Peri and Manacorda et al. seem more reasonable
and thus their results more reliable.
In summary, it seems that for the US and the UK, recent immigration flows have
had little effect on the wages of natives. A branch of the literature on which there is
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This paper analyses the evidence for an upward sloping demand curve for high-
skilled labour. By calibrating a simple multi-sector model of the economy using
high and low-skilled labour as inputs, I find for reasonable values of the parameters
this model supports a demand curve for high skilled labour that is downward
sloping in the short-run but upward sloping in the long-run.
1 Introduction
This paper addresses the conflicting evidence for an upward sloping demand curve for
high-skilled labour. Textbook models predict that as a factor of production becomes
more abundant, its price falls. However, since the late 1970s, the number of workers
with a college degree has been rising rapidly, yet the college premium has also been
rising over the same period.
Models of directed technical change developed in Acemoglu (1998, 2002, 2003a,
2003b, 2007) propose a possible mechanism to explain this phenomenon. Many models
of endogenous technological change focus on a single type of technology which increases
aggregate productivity. In practice, technological change is often not neutral: it affects
some factors of production more than others. Acemoglu (2007) shows that if technolo-
gies are factor augmenting, an increase in the supply of a factor induces technological
change relatively biased towards that factor. Under certain conditions, this induced bias
is strong enough that the marginal product or price of a factor increases in its supply.
To my knowledge, no empirical investigation of whether or not this theorem holds in the
data exists. Caselli (1999) presents a similar model in which skill-biased technological
revolutions induce capital reallocation from the low to high-skill sectors, increasing the
relative wage of workers in the high-skill sector. The paper relates changes in industry
capital intensity to the skill composition of the labour force.
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A related branch of the literature concerns the effects on wages of high skilled
immigration. The evidence for a positive effect of high-skilled immigration on the
skill premium is mixed. Grossmann and Stadelmann (2012) argue that international
migration of high-skilled workers triggers productivity effects such that the wage rate
of skilled workers may rise in host countries and fall in source countries. On the other
hand, Borjas (2003) finds that immigration lowers the wage of competing skill groups
with the own factor price elasticity for high skilled workers to be between -0.317 and
-0.348 depending on the workers’ level of experience.
In this paper I will present a model based on Epifani and Gancia (2008) who de-
velop a model in which increased trade between similar countries can increase the skill
premium. Their result is conditional on stronger returns to scale in the skill-intensive
sector compared to the unskill-intensive sector, so increasing the scale of production
results in skill-biased wage effects. While this paper does not consider explicitly the
effects of trade on the skill premium, an increase in the number of a particular type of
worker in the economy leads to an increase in the scale of operations in the correspond-
ing sector and affects relative wages via the same channel. Thoenig and Verdier (2003)
and Neary (2002) propose models whereby trade between similar countries leads to skill-
biased technological change. The mechanism underlying both models is that increased
competition spurs ”defensive innovation” whereby firms implement skill-intensive tech-
nologies in order to deter entry.
I develop a simple multi-sector model of the economy using high and low-skilled
labour as inputs in a static and a dynamic setting. The economy is modelled using a
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) approach, where there are two final good sectors; a low-skilled and
a high-skilled labour sector. Final goods are produced by using varieties of intermediate
goods, which are supplied under monopolistic competition. This paper then analyses
the effect of a change in the number of high-skilled workers on relative prices and
wages. The static model is an equilibrium model, where the number of intermediate
varieties is defined by zero profit conditions. The dynamic approach allows for a gradual
convergence back towards the steady state in response to a change in the number of
high-skilled workers. Then I calibrate this model using European Labour Force Survey
data and data on the skill premium for a sample of 18 countries. The results from
the calibration of both the static and the dynamic model support the hypothesis that
increasing the number of skilled workers in an economy can increase the relative wage
of high skilled workers. Calibration of the dynamic model produces results that are
consistent with a demand curve for skilled labour that is downward sloping in the
short-run but upward sloping in the long-run as in Acemoglu (2007).
I am first going to present the static model in the following section 2, before pre-
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senting a dynamic model in section 3, which accounts for gradual adjustments to the
steady state. I then attempt to calibrate the model to the data using different measures
for fit of the data in section 4, before providing a brief conclusion in section 5.
2 A Static Model
This model is based on Epifani and Gancia (2008) who show that the increasing the
size of an economy can increase the skill premium. They emphasise trade induced
scale effects. This paper focuses on the effects of changes in the size as well as the
composition of the labour force, e.g. due to immigration. Consider an economy in












where Yi represents consumption of final good i and ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between the two final goods.
2.1 Consumers
Taking the standard approach in this Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) setting by maximising utility
with respect to the consumer’s budget constraint, we get the following relative demand









where Pi is the price of final good i.
2.2 Firms















where yi (v) is the amount of intermediate variety type v used in production of final
good i, Yi is the amount of final good i and σi > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between any two types of intermediate good in production of final good i. Intermediate
varieties v are supplied monopolistically and one can think of each variety v as a firm.














Assume that sector h uses only skilled labour and sector l uses only unskilled labour.
The total number of skilled and unskilled workers in the economy are H and L respec-
tively. The production of each intermediate in sector i involves a fixed requirement, Fi,
and a constant marginal requirement, ci, of labour. The total cost function of a single
variety produced in sector i is:
TCi = (Fi + ciyi)wi (5)
where wh and wl are the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labour respectively. Fi and
ci are the same for every firm in sector i and therefore all firms in sector i hire the same
amount of labour.
Profit maximisation under monopolistic competition implies that price is given by
a constant mark-up over marginal cost:




The ratio of prices of intermediate goods h and l can be expressed as an increasing











where ω = whwl
Free entry means that profits must be zero in equilibrium:






wi = 0 (8)
which implies that:






















The effect of an increase in varieties in sector i is equivalent to a model with technical
change biased in favour of labour working in sector i as in Acemoglu (2007). This






as productivity in such models.
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2.3 Equilibrium
Total demand for high (low) skilled labour must equal the stock of high (low) skilled




(chyh (v) + Fh) dv = H, (12)
nl∫
0
(clyl (v) + Fl) dv = L. (13)
Since firms are symmetric and all firms in sector i produce the same output we get









If we assume constant returns to scale in both intermediate and final good pro-
duction in sector l, i.e. Fl = 0 and σl = ∞, and normalise cl = 1, then profits in
intermediate sector l are always zero, independent of the number of intermediate goods
and nl can take any value.
Equations (11) and (15) can be simplified as follows:





which can be used to derive an expression for final good output in sector l.
Yl = nlyl = L (18)
Epifani and Gancia (2008) survey the literature and find that most studies find
no significant departure from constant returns to scale in low-skill-intensive industries.
There is more disagreement about the degree of returns to scale in skill intensive in-
dustries.
Since profits in both, final good production and intermediate good production, are
zero, total expenditure in the economy equals the total wages paid to labour:
Y = PlYl + PhYh = wlL+ whH. (19)
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The zero profit condition implies that total wages in sector h equals total revenue
of intermediate firms in sector h, which equals total expenditure on final good Yh,
whH = nhphyh = PhYh =
P ε−1l




where the final step in this equation comes from substituting the relative demand given
by (2) into (13).
Applying the same steps for sector l, we get
wlL = nlplyl = PlYl =
P ε−1h




The aggregate price level in this economy is defined as:
P =
[



























































is a constant. As can be seen in equation (22), the wage ratio is increasing in H if
ε > σh > 1.
For the skill premium to be increasing in the number of high skilled workers in
the economy it is required that ε > σh > 1, i.e. the elasticity of substitution between
the skill-intensive final good and the less skill-intensive final good is greater than the
elasticity of substitution between different intermediate goods in production of final
good H, which is greater than 1. Epifani and Gancia (2008) start with the assumption
that σl > σh > ε, however σh > ε is not necessary for their result that an increase in
market size increases the skill premium. The model presented in this paper supports
their result since σl > σh, which is the necessary condition. Epifani and Gancia (2008)
do not attempt to calibrate σh but assume that it is smaller than σl presumably because
this generates the result that increasing the proportion of workers who are skilled
decreases the skill premium which is what standard economic theory would predict.
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Production of final good H is increasing and the price of final good H is decreasing
in the number of intermediate varieties used if σh is greater than 1. The degree of
returns to scale in production of final good H is σhσh−1 . The increase in the number of
intermediate varieties in sector H following an increase in the number of high-skilled
workers reduces the price of final good H. This increases demand for intermediate goods
in sector H and increases the wages of high skilled workers. The effect on the price of
final good H is greater if σh is close to (but bigger than) 1. If epsilon is greater than
σh, the positive effect on wages of high killed workers due to the increase in demand for
intermediate goods in sector h is greater than the negative effect due to the increased
supply of high skilled workers.
2.4 Prices and Wages














































Substituting in the relative wage, determined by (22), and simplifying, we can say that
























The real wage of a worker in sector h is
wh = ωwl, (30)
































The real wage of workers in sector h is increasing in the number of high skilled
workers, H, and therefore in high skilled labour supply in the economy, if ε > σh > 1.
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The relative price is therefore unambiguously decreasing in H.
3 A Dynamic Model
In the static model presented so far, we assumed that we are always in equilibrium.
Intuitively in a dynamic setting the model would imply that adjustments to the steady
state are instant. Whenever profits are non-zero, the number of varieties adjusts in-
stantly. In the following dynamic model, we will allow for the adjustment to be gradual.




are as described in the previous section. It is reasonable to assume that the number of
varieties, which can be thought of as a proxy for the level of technology, changes slowly.
This is consistent with the models of Acemoglu (1998, 2002, 2003, 2007). Following
an increase in H, new varieties appear but adjustment to the new steady state is not






Suppose there are nh,t varieties active in the market at time t. Define ∆nh,t ≡
nh,t− nh,t−1. There is a congestion externality whereby entry by new varieties reduces
the output of all varieties by 1chC (∆nh,t). This congestion externality can be thought of
as (non-labour) resources being used in the creation of new varieties e.g. in research and
development, reducing the resources available for existing varieties to use in production.






if ∆nh,t ≥ 0
0 if ∆nh,t < 0.
(34)
Using the production technology for intermediate goods introduced in (4) and notic-
ing that intermediary firms within a sector are identical and hence have identical labour


















Using our definition of n∗h,t and equation (8), defining the intermediary good price,


































if n∗h,t ≥ nh,t−1
n∗h,t − nh,t−1 if n∗h,t < nh,t−1.
(38)
3.1 Wages
In a given period t firms enter until profits net of congestion externality are zero. Profits
in intermediate sector H (and in final sector H) net of the congestion externality are













































Taking simple derivatives, we can show how the relative wage depends on the num-
























We know from the static model that in the long run the positive effect of an increase
in the number of varieties must dominate over the negative effect from having more
high skilled workers. If this model was in continuous time, following an increase in the
number of high-skilled workers in the economy, we would expect the skill premium to
fall initially followed by a gradual rise until the new steady state is reached where the
skill premium is higher than before the increase in high-skilled workers.
In the discrete model the change in the skill premium following an increase in the
number of high skilled workers between two consecutive periods is given by:
44






























This equation is derived by combining the expression for the relative wage (38) in period
t − 1 and t with the first case of the definition of ∆nh,t in (36). The first case is the
relevant one, because we assume that there has been an increase in H. The adjustment
to the new steady state following a decrease as shown in (36) would be instant.














∆ωt may be positive or negative depending on the magnitude of the change in the
number of high skilled workers, the number of varieties in the previous period, and the
speed of adjustment, Fhγ+Fh . The different directions of the short and long run effects
of an increase in the number of high skilled workers on the skill premium may account
for the lack of consensus from the immigration literature on whether or not high skilled
migration raises the skill premium.
3.2 Prices



























Taking simple derivatives, we can identify the changes in the relative price cause by
























Following an increase in the number of high skilled workers (H), keeping the number
of varieties (n) constant, the relative price of final good H falls. As new intermediate




Epifani and Gancia use data from the OECD STAN database to find a relationship
between relative expenditure on skill-intensive goods (compared to expenditure on low-
skill-intensive goods) and the relative price of skill-intensive goods and estimate an
elasticity of substitution of 1.44. This is consistent with the empirical evidence on the
degree of substitution between high and low skilled labour, which is also represented
by epsilon in this model. Their literature review concludes that most estimates for the
elasticity of substitution between more and less educated labour lie in the range from
1 to 2 and therefore take ε = 1.5 as a reasonable benchmark. I let ε = 1.5 and σlσl−1 = 1
as in Epifani and Gancia, and allow the substitution elasticity of intermediate varieties
in the production of final good H, σh, to vary when calibrating equation 22.
4.1 Data
Table 1 shows the number of high skilled workers in the labour force, the number of
low skilled workers in the labour force and the skill premium in years 1 and N. Year 1
is the earliest year for which data on the labour force breakdown by skill level and data
on the skill premium are available for a given country. Year N is the latest year for
which data on the labour force breakdown by skill level and data on the skill premium
are available for a given country. The numbers of high and low skilled workers in the
labour force are calculated from the EU Labour Force Survey database. Those aged 65
or more and children less than 15 years old are excluded from the sample.
The labour force includes anyone who worked for one hour or more for pay or
profit during the reference week (including family workers but excluding conscripts on
compulsory military or community service); anyone who was not working but had a
job or business from which he/she was absent during the reference week (including
family workers but excluding conscripts on compulsory military or community service);
anyone who is seeking employment; anyone who did not work during the reference week
but who has found a job that they have not yet started.
Workers are classified as high skilled if they have successfully completed tertiary
education (those with an education level of 5b, 5a or 6 according to ISCED 1997 levels).
All other workers are classified as low skilled. For some years in some countries, it was
not compulsory to answer the question about educational attainment. In these cases
I have assumed that the response rate does not depend on the education level and
allocated the non-responders to high or low skilled groups according to the ratio of
responders in each group for that particular country in that year. This assumption
may not seem very plausible; however, in most cases the non-response rate is very
small and hence this assumption should not affect results noticeably. The non-response
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rate is generally less than 3 percent, the exceptions being Germany in 2003 and 2004
where it is around 4 percent, Ireland in 2006 where it is 3.5 percent and the UK between
2000 and 2003 where it is between 8 and 9 percent.
Data on the skill premium comes from the OECD report “Education at a Glance
2013”. It measures the ratio of the wage of 25-64 year olds (male and female) with
tertiary education to the wage of those with upper secondary education.
Table 1:
4.2 The Static Model
I first consider the static model presented in section two of this paper. Taking ε = 1.5
as in Epifani and Gancia, I look at different plausible values of σh to see with which
value the model’s predictions for the change in skill premium between years 1 and N
best matches the data. The results are presented in tables 2-4, where different criteria
are used with regards to what constitutes a good fit.
Table 2 shows the correlation between the model’s predictions and the data on the
change in skill premium between years 1 and N for different values of σh. Table 3 shows
the square root of the expected squared distance from the 45 degree line if the model’s
predictions for each country were plotted on a graph against the data. Table 4 shows







The tables indicate that setting σh = 1.21 maximises the correlation between the
model’s predictions and the data, while the expected deviation from the 45 degree line
is minimised when σh = 1.4 or σh = 1.36 if countries are weighted by labour force
size. Hence depending on the measure for the fit, I calibrate σh to be in the range
of 1.21 − 1.40. The following graphs, figure 1 and 2, show the model’s predictions for
the change in skill premium against the data when σh = 1.21. i.e. when maximising
correlation between the model’s prediction and the data, and when σh = 1.4, i.e. when
minimising the square root of expected squared distance from the 45 degree line:
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Figure 1: Static model with σh = 1.21
Figure 2: Static model with σh = 1.4
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4.3 The Dynamic Model
Now I consider the dynamic model, in which the number of varieties adjusts gradually
when out of steady state, using the same three different criteria for a good model fit.
I assume that all countries are in steady state in year 1. Taking ε = 1.5 as before,
there are now two parameters to calibrate: σh and the speed of adjustment parameter,
k = Fhγ+Fh .
Table 5 shows the correlation between the model’s predictions and the data on the
change in skill premium between years 1 and N for different values of σh and k. Table
6 shows the square root of the expected squared distance from the 45 degree line if the
model’s predictions for each country were plotted on a graph against the data. Table 7
shows the square root of the expected squared distance from the 45 degree line weighted





In general the calibration results do not differ much for the different criteria. The
model performs reasonably well in all three measures of fit if σh = 1.25 and k = 0.4.
The following graph shows the model’s predictions for the change in skill premium
against the data when σh = 1.25 and k = 0.4.
Figure 3: Dynamic model with σh = 1.25 and k = 0.4
The dynamic version of the model is a significantly better fit for the data than
the static version. This can be seen immediately when comparing figure 3 to figures 1
and 2 representing the static model. The better the fit the closer all points would be
to a line on which the model’s predictions match the data exactly. However, we can
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easily see how the data points are much closer to such a line in the dynamic setting.
Ireland remains a noticeable outlier, although much less so in the dynamic model.
Other countries such as Poland, which are not matched well by the model in the static
setting, are much better matched in the dynamic setting.
This implies that the number of intermediate varieties, or the level of technology,
does not adjust instantaneously. The estimated value of k = 0.4 between the number
of firms and the steady state number of firms shrinks by 40 percent each period. This
provides a possible explanation for the lack of consensus in the literature on estimates
of the degree of returns to scale in skill-intensive sectors. Suppose there is a one off
increase in the number of high-skilled workers in an economy. Output in the skill-
intensive sector will increase immediately in response to the increase in skilled labour,
and will continue to increase over time as the level of skill biased technology increases.
If one was to estimate the degree of returns to scale in the skill-intensive industry over
a short time horizon, assuming that technology adjusts instantly, the estimate would
be too low.
So far in this paper I have assumed that an increase in the number of high skilled
workers is followed by investment in skill-biased technology. It is possible that the
causality is in the reverse direction: an exogenous shock which increases the level of
skill-biased technology could be followed by an increase in high-skilled workers as more
people acquire skills and high-skilled immigration increases in response to the higher
skill premium. The fact that the dynamic model is a better fit for the data is evidence
in favour of the former hypothesis. If the high skilled labour force adjusts in response to
changes in technology, and adjustments are not instantaneous because skill acquisition
takes time and it is reasonable to expect that individuals plan to emigrate some time
in advance of actually doing so, then the dynamic model ought to be a worse fit for the
data.
For countries with recent large increases in the number of high-skilled workers,
the skill premium is likely to be further from (and lower than) its steady state value.
For a given σh, the static model predicts a higher value for the skill premium than
the dynamic model for these countries. If the number of high skilled workers in an
economy adjusts (not instantaneously) in response to changes in the skill premium,
then the static model would predict too low value for the skill premium for countries
with recent large increases in the number of high-skilled workers because the observed
number of high-skilled workers is lower than the steady state value associated with a
given value of the skill premium. The dynamic model, which would predict even lower
values for the skill premium for these countries, would be a worse fit for the data.
The most conservative estimate of σh provided by the calibrations in this and the
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previous section are somewhat larger than those cited by Epifani and Gancia (2008).
Antweiler and Treffler (2002) estimate that average scale elasticity in skill-intensive
sectors is around 1.2, corresponding to a σh of around 6. Morrison Paul and Siegel
(1999) estimate returns to scale in US manufacturing industries and a value of σh of
3.5 is consistent with their results. However, both of these papers rely on relatively old
datasets. Antweiler and Treffler (2002) use data between 1972 and 1992, and Morrison
and Siegel (1999) between 1979 and 89. It is possible that technological change has
increased the average scale elasticity in skill-intensive industries over the last 20 to 30
years. As far as I am aware there is currently no literature concerning this hypothesis.
Additionally, capital reallocation between sectors following changes in the labour force,
as in Caselli (1999), would magnify the wage effect. It is likely that calibration of a
model that includes capital, like that presented by Epfani and Gancia (2008), would
produce more conservative, i.e. higher, estimates of σh.
5 Conclusion
The estimates for σh from both the static and the dynamic model using various criteria
to measure the fit of the model to the data are between 1.21 and 1.4, all of which
are consistent with an upward sloping long-run relative demand curve for high-skilled
labour as in Acemoglu (1998, 2002, 2003, 2007).
The effect of an increase in the number of high skilled workers is an increase in
the wages of both high and low-skilled workers, but the wage of high-skilled workers
increases more, increasing the skill premium. This implies that there is some human
capital externality generated by an increase in the number of skilled workers in an
economy which increases the relative productivity of high-skilled workers. In this paper
I have modelled this as a an increase in the number of varieties in intermediate sector h,
but it could be due to skill-biased technical change or learning spillovers between high-
skilled workers. Furthermore, we have seen that the effects of an increase in the number
of high skilled workers on the skill premium can potentially differ in their directions
when comparing the effects in the short and long run. This could account for the lack
of consensus in the literature.
An area for further research could be to use this model, or a variation of it, to
estimate the effect that recent immigration flows have had on wage inequality.
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